Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

1986

Marcy G. Myers v. Darlene Stout (Copple) : Brief of
Appellant
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Carl J. Nemelka; Attorney for Respondent.
Royal K. Hunt; Attorney for Appellant.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Myers v. Stout, No. 860279 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1986).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1/173

This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

U l A l t W V n i vw #M-t-fcrf-»^v

UTAH
DOCUMENT
KFU
50
.A10
DOCKET NO.

K(,Q2 ??
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

MARCY

MYERS,
t i f'l:--Appnl 1 .nil ,
V.

No. I<6l)',!79

DARLENE STOUT (COPPLE),

(Category I 4 b.)

Defenaa.i

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

Appeal from a final judgment of the
Third District Court, Salt Lake County, State of Utah,
Honorable Philip R. Fishier, Presiding
_

Royal K. Hunt (USB# 1590)
2290 East 4500 South
#170
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117
Tel. No. 801 278 4417
Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellant
Carl J. Nemelka (USB# 2395)
75 North Center
American Fork, Utah 84003
Tel. No. 801 756 6071
Attorney for DefendantRespondent

' AUG ID 1937
Sb-oziq-Qh

^

COURT O^ #oocA! c-

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

MARCY G. MYERS,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
No. 860279

V.
DARLENE STOUT (COPPLE),

(Category 14 b.)

Defendant-Respondent.

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

Appeal from a final judgment of the
Third District Court, Salt Lake County, State of Utah,
Honorable Philip R. Fishier, Presiding
Royal K. Hunt (USB# 1590)
2290 East 4500 South #170
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117
Tel. No. 801 278 4417
Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellant
Carl J. Nemelka (USB# 2395)
75 North Center
American Fork, Utah 84003
Tel. No. 801 756 6071
Attorney for DefendantRespondent

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
Statement of Jurisdiction

1

Statement of Issues Presented for Review

1
1

Statement of the Case

\

2

Summary of Argument

>

12

Argument
Conclusion
Proof of Mailing

13
h

18
18

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page
Case citations:
Bradshaw v. McBride, 649 P.2d 74 (Utah 1982)
Cady v. Johnson, 671 P.2d 149 (Utah 1983)

17
16 , 17

Carbine v. Meyer, 126 Cal.2d 386, 272 P.2d
849 (1954)

16

Christensen v. Christensen, 9 Utah 2d 102,
339 P.2d 101 (1959)

16

Coombs v. Ouzounian, 24 Utah 2d 39, 465 P.2d
356 (1970)

17

Family Finance Fund v. Abraham, 657 P.2d
1319 (Utah 1982)
-tHandy v. Shiells, 235 Cal.R^tr. 543 (Cal.
App. 1 Dist. 1987)
Holmgren Brothers, Inc. v. Ballard, 534 P.2d
611 (Utah 1975)

17 , 18
16
15 , ic

McDonald v. Barton Bros. Inv. Corp., 631 P.2d
851 (Utah 1981)

15

Minnesota Debenture Co. v. Johnson, 94 Minn.
150, 102 NW 381 (1905)

13

Nelson v. Davis, 592 P.2d 594 (Utah 1979)

16

Texas American Bank/Levelland v. Morgan,
733 P.2d 864 (N.M. 1987)

16

Tracy Collins Trust Co. v. Goeltz, 5 Utah 2d
350, 301 P.2d 1086 (1956)

16

Williams v. Singleton, 723 P.2d 421 (Utah 1986)

16

Constitutional provisions, statutes, and rules:
§78-12-25, U.C.A., 1953, as amended
(reprinted at Addendum A)

i

14

(Table of Authorities, con'j:)
Statute of frauds, §§ 25-5-1,3,8, and 9 (1984)
reprinted in brief

ii

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

MARCY G. MYERS,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
No. 860279

V.
DARLENE STOUT (COPPLE),
Defendant-Appellant.

S

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Plaintiff has appealed a judgment of the Third
District Court quieting title to real property in the defendantrespondent.

The judgment is dated June 10, 1986, and was

appealed to the Supreme Court of Utah on November 24, 1986,
and by that court transferred to the Utah Court of Appeals
which has jurisdiction under §78-2a-3(2)(h), U.C.A., 1953, as
amended.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
Whether the judgment is supported by the facts,

husband and wifef owned the property jointly (Tr. Vol III pp. 6-7,
14-15, 22; Exhibit 16-P).

On April 26, 1976, they jointly executed

a trust deed on the property to Tracy Collins Bank.

The installment

payments on the trust deed note were current at the time of trial
(Tr. Vol. VII 10-13; Exhibits 24-D and 25-D).

On July 21, 1978,

Al Smith Const. Co. by Alvin R. Smith sold the property to defendant
Stout under the terms of a uniform real estate contract (Tr. Vol.
II pp. 3-4; Tr. Vol. VII p. 90; Tr. Vol. IX p. 5; Exhibits 1-D, 12-P!
Payments of $25000, $500, and $5000 were made by defendant Stout
to Alvin R. Smith (Tr. Vol II pp. 59-61).

The payment for August

1, 1978, and those made thereafter until April 20, 1979, were
made to Alvin R. Smith (Tr. Vol. VII pp. 43-45).
The check representing the April 20, 1979, payment was
payable to Alvin and Sandra Smith and contained the notation
"Mortgage payment to date for 4120 Donibristle Rd."

The check

was endorsed by both payees (Tr. Vol. VII pp. 41-43, 45; Exhibit
4-D).

At about this time, on April 18, 1979, defendant caused

to be recorded a Notice of Interest (Exhibit 18-P) in which she
declared her interest in the property to be "evidenced by a
certain Uniform Real Estate Contract dated July 21, 1978, by and
between Al Smith Construction Company as Seller, and the
undersigned Darlene Stout as buyer."

Defendant did not explain the

tardiness of the recording of the notice of interest nor the apparent
coincidence of the time of recording with the first inclusion as
payee of Sandra Smith on the payment checks (Exhibit 4-D).
The check representing the May 8, 1979, payment, was

(3)

issued in the same manner as the Apri]| 20, 1979, check,

Sandra

Smith endorsed the names of both payees to the May 8, 1979, check
(Tr. Vol VII. p. 47; Exhibit 38-D).
The check representing the June 5, 1979, payment was
issued to "Sandra & Alvin Smith Const." with notation "Mortgage
to Date on Above Address [4120 Donibristle Road, South Jordan,
Utah 84065]," and again Sandra Smith provided the only endorsemen
(Tr. Vol. VII. p. 46; Exhibit 37-D).
The check representing the July 5, 1979, payment was
issued

to "Al and Sandra Smith," with notation "Mortgage to Date

and Sandra Smith again provided the only endorsement (Tr. Vol. VI
p. 47; Exhibit 39-D).
The check representing the September 5, 1979, payment
was payable to "Al & Sandra Smith" with notation "Contract to Dat
House above [Jack or Darlene Stout 41^0 Donibristle Road, South
Jordan, Utah 84065]," and Sandra Smith provided the only endorseir
(Tr. Vol. VII. p. 48; Exhibit 41-D).
The check representing the October 1, 1979, payment was
payable to "Al & Sandra Smith," with notation "Paid to Contract t
Date 4120 Donibristle," and was endorsed "Al & Sandra Smith" by
Sandra Smith only (Tr. Vol. VII. pp. 47-48; Exhibit 40-D).
The check representing the November 7, 1979, payment wa
payable to "Al & Sandra Smith" with notation "Paid to Contract,"
and was endorsed by Sandra Smith "For Deposit Only Al & Sandra
Smith."

(Tr. Vol. VII. pp. 48-50; Exhibit 42-D).

(4)

The check representing the December 5, 1979, payment
was payable to "Al & Sandra Smith," with notation "Contract to
Datef" and was endorsed by Sandra Smith "Al & Sandra Smith."
(Tr. Vol. VII. pp. 50-51; Exhibit 43-D).
The check representing the January 1, 1980, payment
payable to "Al & Sandra Smith," with notation "Contract to
Date," was endorsed by Sandra Smith "Al and Sandra Smith By
Sandra H. Smith."

(Tr. Vol. VII. p. 49; Exhibit 44-D).

In 1980 then defendant Stout commenced making payments
directly to the bank (Tr. Vol VII. pp. 55-59; Exhibit 7-D).
As to the inclusion of Sandra Smith's name on the payment
checks, defendant Stout testified that she (Stout) was told by
Sandra Smith to put her (Sandra's) name on the checks (Tr. Vol.
VII. p. 67). The reasons given by Sandra, as testified to by
defendant, were that "since [Sandra Smith] took care of the bank
accounts and she [Sandra Smith] paid all the deposits to the banks,
to put her name because she was part of the construction company
and that she made all the deposits."

(Tr. Vol. VII p. 67, Lines

6-9); "Al was certainly not a businessman and if she didn't keep
him straight he couldn't keep his head on straight, something to
that effect, in a very joking manner;" (Tr. Vol. VII p. 67, Lines
13-15); "'Darlene [Stout], make it [check] out to Al and Sandra
Smith or Al and Sandra Smith Construction, because I'm the one that
makes all the deposits.1"

(Tr. Vol. VII p. 67. Lines 19-23).

(5)

n

She specifically told me to make the checks out to Al and

Sandra."

(Tr. Vol VII p. 68, Lines 24-25).

In answer to

plaintiff's counsel's question, "Isn't it true that you
started putting Sandra Smith's name on the check because you
had been told by someone that she hadn't signed the contract
and you needed to do that to involve her?", defendant Stout
answered, "No, Sandra Smith told me to put her name on the
checks."

And to plaintiff's counsel's next question, "So that

she [Sandra Smith] could deposit them?", defendant Stout answered
"So that she [Sandra Smith] could take care of her business. She
said she had to run them through her books."

(Tr. Vol. VII p.

72, Line 25; p. 73, Lines 1-8).
On December 31, 1980, Sandra Smith conveyed her interes
in the property by warranty deed to Capital Recovery Corporation.
The deed was dated and was recorded that day (Exhibit 19-P; Tr.
Vol. Ill p. 18).
At the time of the judgment (June 10, 1986) the present
plaintiff was, and is, the record owner of the Sandra Smith
interest (Tr. Vol. Ill p. 23; Tr. vol VII pp. 6-8, 10-11; Exhibil
23-P).
Before July 21, 1978 (the date of the contract),
defendant Stout and Sandra Smith "talk[ed] about the purchase
of the house."

(Tr. Vol. II pp. 15-16).

They further "discusse<

the house and its sale after they talked (Tr. Vol. II p. 1 , .
These talks and discussions between defendant Stout and Sandra

(6)

relating to the sale of the house, however, did not move
defendant Stout to request Sandra Smith's joinder in executing
the contract (Tr. Vol. II p. 20).
As testified to by defendant Stout, on these occasions
of talking and discussing, Sandra Smith statements were:
"[T]hey had lived there and it was a lovely home
and it was professionally decorated. She told me
a great deal about the interior, about the decor
about the rooms, and that it was too large for them.
And since my [defendant Stout's] husband worked for
Al as an agent, that she was delighted that — not
only that, you know, we would move in there if we
did, but that she would be living close by and we
could run around together, which we did [Tr. Vol.
II p. 16, Lines 17-25].
Again as told by defendant Stout,
"Sandra Smith showed me through the house and pointed
out various details about it, such as the fact that the
sprinkler system had — had the automatic sprinklers.
It had a vacuum, which she showed me how to use and
she brought out the attachments, the fact that the
decor was professionally decorated by her and the
decorator and that there were certain pieces of furniture that if I chose to purchase them from her, that I
could.
"The fact that she had the pool table and she said they
were moving into a condominium and that they'd let the
pool table go with the house because it would cost them
too much to move it.
"The fact that it had garage door openers and various
other — . "
[Tr. Vol. VII pp. 28-29]
"She [Sandra Smith] said that the purchase price at
that time was ninety-seven five. She said that she
had sold the house about six months prior but the deal
fell through and she was desperate to sell it.
"And I [defendant Stout] told her that my home was —
that I was presently living in was for sale and that I
liked her home and that in the event my home sold that
I would be interested.

(7)

"And she [Sandra Smith] said — well, she says
'We can work it out.1 She said that she had
the dinette set that was specially ordered for
the home and it would not fit into her condominium."
[Tr. Vol. VII p. 29]
"She [Sandra Smith] told me she wanted to sell
her home and she said that — she's the one that
gave me the brochure on the home when it was in
the 1976 parade of homes. [Tr. Vol. VII p. 30]
"Q. [Nemelka] You stated that there was a home
sales book that she gave you?
A. [defendant Stout] Yes, she did.
Q. Show you what's been marked for identification
defense Exhibit 15 and ask you to identify that
exhibit.
A. Yes. This is the original book that she gave me.
. . . .

Q. Did you have a conversation with Sandra Smith
at the first meeting you had with her concerning
Exhibit 15-D?
A. Yes, I did.
. . . .

Q. Now, you testified about the purchase price at
that time?
A. Yes.
Q. You discussed that with Sandra Smith?
A. Yes.
Q. What did she tell you about the purchase price?
A. She told me that she wanted to sell the house,
that was the price.
Q. What was the price?
A. Ninety-seven five was thd price. And she also stated
that since she and her husband were in the construction
business, that she moved periodically because they always moved in a home and then he sold it. She said she
feld like a gypsy." [Tr. Vol. VII pp. 32-35]
"Well, I remember we were in the kitchen and we discuss
the dinette set and we discussed the — . " [Tr. Vol. VI
p. 40]
"Yes. That's when the conversations were held [between
the first one sometime ?n May, June 1978 r^i the date
of this contract, on the 21st day of July 1978].
Q. [Nemelka] And did you have conversations at that
time with Sandra Smith?
j
A. [defendant Stout] Yes. ± did every time.

(8)

Q. Was it about the purchase price of the property?
A. Yes
[Tr. VII pp. 40-41]
Q. [Nemelka] I want you to tell the court what she
told you about this Al Smith's Construction Company.
A. [defendant Stout] She said that she was tired of being
in the construction business because every time she
moved in and decorated a home she knew that she was
going to have to move out.
She also told me that she had recently moved out
of a home before moving into this one, a duplicate
of my house, which is in Riverton right now, and Al
Smith had — construction had built that home. She
moved into that home thinking that she could stay
there for a while but, she said, 'because our business
is such we have to sell the homes because we make a
nice profit on them.' And she says, 'and we have to
sell the homes and move.'
And she kept telling me: 'I feel like a gypsy.
Every time I move in and get settled and have the home
just the way I want it, then I know that we're going
to sell it.' And she said, 'I'm very glad that you
are buying it because your husband works with Jack
and' — excuse — 'you're really going to love it.'
She said this was one of her favorite homes.
[Tr. Vol. VII pp.61-62]
"Sandra told me that they had bought the condominium
and they were making double payments; and that she says,
'I wish Al wouldn't do this to me because I have all
this bookwork to do all the time.
"And at that point I went over to her house on numerous
occasions and her office was in the basement and she had
files — she had files there in her desk and usually I
had to sit and wait before we went out to lunch because
she had to finish up some bookwork [concerning Al Smith
Construction]"
[Tr. Vol. VII p. 63]
"She [Sandra Smith] said that — that she had purchased
the condominium and she wanted to move into the
condominium because this house was way too large for
her because her son had moved out or was not longer
living at home.
And she said she and her husband and her daughter lived
there and it was much too large, and she was anxious to
get moved into her next place. She said that — she
used to tell me: 'The gypsy is on the run again,' that
type of thing."
[Tr. Vol. VII p. 72]

(9)

Sandra Smith's statements to defendant Stout, as told
by Deanna Copple, defendant Stout's daughter, were,
(Q. [Nemelka] And could you I tell the court what Sandra
Smith said relating to the purchase or the sale of that home on
Donibristle. . . . Was there any conversation about the sale of
the home?)
[Deanna Copple] Yes. I remertiber her [Sandra Smith]
saying, "I 'was' real anxious because I loved the
house." . . . Okay, yeah. She was real anxious to
sell the home because she had already purchased the
little condominium up the street. She mentioned to
us that she wanted to get out of the yard work; she
was sick of pulling weeds. . . . She went through
details of — they had a lot of new gadgets, the
vacuum cleaner. She told me that the sprinkler systems
— that it leaked and where the pool table was, the
window wells.
(Q. [Nemelka]

Did a purchase price ever come up durinc

this conversation?)
It was almost a hundred thousand, I remember, because
it was — . . . yes, yes. I remember it was almost a
hundred thousand.
(Q. [Nemelka]

And who mentioned the purchase price?)

It was Sandra Smith.
[Tr. Vol. VII pp. 77-78
Q. [Nemelka] Now, did the subject of Al Smith Construd
Company come up during any of those conversations?
A. [Denna Copple] Yes. Sandra —
Q. What did Sandra say about that company?
A. It was always 'our company.' She always said, 'ours
She — she told us that Al built the whole house; this
was a duplicate of one in Riverton.
Q. What did she say in relation to that house?
A. She decorated it, she had a lot of input in the des
of the house.
I
Q. Are there any conversations about her decorating an
other homes?
A. Yes. She — she — its was a hobby to her. She liketo do it. As a matter of fact, she couldn't wait to ha
us see her new condo and show how she redecorated that
(10)

whole place.
Q. Was there any conversations by her during this period
of time as to whether she decorated all the homes involved
in Al Smith Construction Company, or most of them?
A. Most of them, yea.
Q. Tell the court what Sandra Smith said regarding her
decorating any of these homes that were . . . being
bought and sold. Q. Tell us what Sandra Smith said
about decorating all these homes for the construction
company.
A. She said that she loved to do it. That was, she
considered, her job. Al built homes. She decorated
them. She — everything that she does put in the house,
I remember her saying, was specifically designed for
the house, such as, the bar stools matched the wood —
I mean, just in detail. This woman loved to tell me
or tell us how everthng was just made for the house.
Q. Did you ever see her do any bookkeeping work in
your presence?
A. Yes, I did.
Q. Describe for the judge what you saw when you went
into that —
A. Okay. It was when I saw — it was after we were
living in the Donibristle house. We went over. They
invited us, I guess. Mom did make a payment to her,
but she wanted to show me her daughter's new bedroom.
So I walked in. Her daughter answered the door. We went
downstairs to the office. Sandra was sitting at the desk
doing bookwork. Darlene and Sandra started talking.
Darlene had already had the check written out, just
presented it for her, and then in turn they sent the
two girls upstairs to look at the house.
Q. Now, what did you observe there in that office around?
A. Personally, it was a mess. We don't know if that
has any bearing.
Q. What business was she involved in?
A. She had bookwork. She had a big book like a ledger
she was writing in. I remember a huge book because I
was over —
Q. In any of these conversations that you had, how many
did you totally have with Sandra Smith now?
A. At least four.
Q. In any of those conversations, did you ever hear
Sandra Smith tell you that she was not selling her
interest in the home?
A. No. She was anxious.
Q. Did you ever hear her say that?
A. I heard her say she was anxious; this was a white
elephant to her now because she had two house payments

(11)

and she couldn't make both of them.
Q. My question to you was: Did you ever hear her say
that she was not going to sell her interest in the
home to your mother?
A. No.
[Tr. Vol. VII pp. 77-83]
In 1980 Sandra Smith would not comply with the requests
of defendant Stout to sign the contract (Tr. Vol. II pp. 17-21;
Tr. Vol. VII pp. 59, 95-96).
On January 21, 1982, Alvin R. Smith d/b/a Al Smith
Construction Company, conveyed a one-half undivided interest in
the property to defendant Stout by warranty deed which deed
defendant Stout had recorded on September 9, 1983 (Tr. Vol. II
pp. 55-56; Exhibit 11-D) while this action was pending and she
was represented by her present counsel.
In the lower court defendant Stout filed her answer
in which she denied the material allegations of the complaint
(R 17-19).

The answer, in conclusory form, contained three

affirmative defenses.

On March 29, 1985, without first having

obtained leave of court, defendant filed her amended answer in
which she alleges again in conclusory form, a number of affirmative defenses (R 180-184).

On December 23, 1985, the lower court

directed that a non-jury trial be scheduled.

(Tr. Vol. VI p. 19)

Plaintiff was not afforded and was denied the opportunity to
demand a jury trial on those issues raised by defendant Stout in
her amended answer properly triable oi right to a jury.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The judgment is not supported by the facts.
(12)

ARGUMENT
Hereaftrer, reference to the "property" shall mean
the one-half undivided interest in the real property described
in these proceedings of Sandra Smith and her successors in
interest.
THE JUDGMENT IS WITHOUT ADJUDICATORY EFFECT:
The basis for the quiet title judgment as to the property does not
appear.

There is no indication how or when defendant Stout

acquired an ownership interest in the property sufficient to
warrant a decree quieting title to the property in her.
Etc. v. Santiago, 590 P.2d 335 (Utah 1979).

State,

A judgment is a link

in the chain of title only where it transfers title or renders
valid a particular link in the chain of title which without the
judgment would be defective or invalid.

Defendant Stout's present

title to the property is based wholly on the judgment of the lower
court.

Nowhere is any independent title exhibited, nor any right

nor interest which the judgment connected to title.

In Minnesota

Debenture Co. v. Johnson, 94 Minn. 150, 102 NW 381 (1905), the
court stated:
"It would be a departure from settled rules to hold
that an ordinary judgment in an action to determine
adverse claims to land, obtained by a total stranger
to the title . . . operates to transfer title, or
constitutes a link in the chain of title, and . . .
admissible in evidence as such against the true
owner . . . "

(13)

(At page 8, beginning at line 1, Vol. Ill/ Transcript, defendant
Stout's attorney is reported as saying
,f

She [Sandra Smith] was actually part of the
contract and orally participated in it, was a
part of all of it; and that her oral contract
was made as of this written agreement [referring
to the uniform real estate contract, Exhibits 1-D
and 12-P].";
what follows reflects plaintiff's pe^eptions of what appear
to be defendant Stout's attorney's contentions in this matter
as taken from his quoted statement.)
MERGER:

Delivery and acceptance of the deed of January

21, 1982, which deed defendant Stout had recorded on September 9,
1983 (Tr. Vol II pp. 55-56; Exhibit 11-D), the provisions of the
uniform contract (Exhibits 1-D and 12-P) are deemed extinguished
and superseded by the deed.

Secor v. Knight, 716 P.2d 790 (Utah

1986)
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS:

If[ as it appears, defendant

Stout is attempting to establish an oral contract and part
performance, she must bring her action to do so within the time
limited by §78-12-25, U.C.A., 1953 (four years).

There is no

clear indication how and when the oral contract referred to came
into being but there was no attempt to assert its existence until
defendant Stout's amended answer on March 29, 1985 (R 180-84).
The only verbal communications relative to the sale of the propei
between defendant Stout and Sandra Smith took place according to
defendant Stout and her daughter, Deanna Copple, before July 21,
1978 (Tr. Vol. Ill pp. 15-16; Tr. Vol. VII pp. 40-41).

(14)

If the

claimed oral contract is separate from the uniform real estate
contract then it is time barred.

The limitations defense was

raised by plaintiff in RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT'S MEMORANDUM (R
374-377) dated April 2, 1986, p. 4 (R 377).

If the addition

of Sandra Smith's name or signature to the uniform contract is
the oral contract the parol evidence rule would preclude such
proof,

McDonald v. Barton Bros. Inv. Corp., 631 P.2d 851 (Utah

1981), as well as being time barred.
PART PERFORMANCE:

Defendant Stout's claim of part

performance is based upon the addition of Sandra Smith's name
as payee on certain checks issued for installment payments
under the uniform contract (Exhibits 4-D, 37-D through 44-D),
and Sandra Smith endorsing such checks for deposit to a bank
account in the joint names of Alvin R. Smith and Sandra Smith,
or to Tracy Collins Bank for the "mortgage" payment.
Making the payments on the uniform real estate contract
cannot be considered part performance of any claimed oral contract;
McDonald, supra.

The acts of part performance must be exclusively

referable to the oral contract.

Holmgren Brothers, Inc. v. Ballard,

534 P.2d 611 (Utah 1975). Besides, the payments were not made
in pursuance of an oral contract but were made in such manner at
Sandra Smith's request, according to defendant Stout's own account,
(Tr. Vol. VII pp. 67-68, 72), "since [Sandra Smith] paid all the
deposits to the banks, to put her name because she was part of
the construction company and that she made all the deposits.",

(15)

and were not so made to involve Sandra Smith in the uniform real
estate contract (Tr. Vol. VII pp. 72-73).
The record is devoid of any bral contract or agreement
by Sandra Smith to sell the property to defendant Stout.

The

terms of such a contract must be clear, definite, mutually understood, and established by clear, unequivocal and definite
testimony, or other evidence of the same quality.

Holmgren,

supra; Christensen v. Christensen, 9 Utah 2d 102, 339 P.2d 101
(1959).
STATUTE OF FRAUDS:

One joint tenant without the

approval of the other can transfer away his or her share of
the property, leaving the remaining joint tenant a tenant in
common with the grantee.

Nelson v. Davis, 592 P.2d 594 (Utah

1979); Tracy Collins Trust Co. v. Goeltz, 5 Ut2d 350, 301 P.2d
1086 (1956).
Where one cotenant undertakes to convey the whole title
to a specific piece of property, the conveyance is not void but
only operates to transfer that individual's interest in the land.
Texas American Bank/Levelland v. Morgan, 733 P.2d 864 (N.M. 1978)
Handy v. Shiells, 235 Cal.Rptr. 543 (Cal.App. 1 Dist. 1987).

One

joint tenant or tenant in common cannot bind his cotenant by a
contract which he may make relating to the common property.
Carbine v. Meyer, 126 Cal,?d 386, 272 P.2d 849 (1954).

There is

no husband-wife exception to the statute of frauds. Williams v
Singleton, 723 P.2d 421 (Utah 1986).

(16)

Only a written power of

attorney will authorize one to bind another to a contract for the
sale of real property.

Cady v. Johnson, 671 P.2d 149 (Utah 1983).

"Ratification" and "acquiescence" are mentioned in
these proceedings as theories of defense.

If the evidence tends

to show acquiescence by Sandra Smith in the uniform contract such
acquiescence was terminated when she refused defendant Stout's
request to sign the contract (Tr. Vol. II pp. 17-21; Tr. Vol.
VII pp. 59, 95-96), and her grant of the property to Capital
Recovery Corporation (Tr. Vol. Ill p. 18; Exhibit 19-P) "amounted
to a tacit repudiation of any conflicting oral agreement on her
part."

Coombs v. Ouzounian, 24 Ut2d 39, 465 P.2d 356 (1970).

And here, as in Bradshaw v. McBride, 649 P.2d 74 (Utah 1982), there
was no ratification as a mater of law "because the Utah statute
of frauds requires that any agent executing an agreement conveying
an interest in land on behalf of his principal must be authorized
in writing.

. . . [and] [w]here the law requires the authority

to be given in writing, the ratification must also generally be in
writing."
The present plaintiff may defend defendant Stout's claims
on the basis of the statute of frauds.

"'Successors in title to

one who has made a contract unenforceable as against himself by
reason of the statute [of frauds] can take advantage of the statute
[of frauds] in the same way that the contractor hirrself could
have done.

. . . Thus, if a vendor makes an oral contract to convey

to A, and then later conveys the land to B, the conveyance to B is
fully operative as against A.'"
(17)

Family Finance Fund v. Abraham,

657 P.2d 1319 (Utah 1982).
CONCLUSION
The judgment is not supported by the evidence and the
facts and should be reversed and the cause remanded to the lower
court with instructions to proceed to partition under the statute

•^/C
ROYAL K. HUNT

PROOF OF MAILING
On August 19, 1987, I mailed four copies of the
foregoing APPELLANT'S BRIEF to Carl J. Nemelka, attorney for
defendant Darlene Stout (Copple), at 75 North Center, American
Forkf Utah 84003, postage for first-class mail fully prepaid
thereon.

in ROYAL

(18)

K. HUNT

ADDENDUM
(Page)
Statute of Limitation, §78-12-25, U.CJA., 1953

A

Uniform Real Estate Contract (Exhibit 1-D)

B

Warranty Deed (Exhibit 11-D)

*

C

ORDER AND JUDGMENT (R 464-466)

*

D

§78-12-25. Within four years.
Within four years:
(1) an action upon a contract, obligation or liability
not founded upon an instrument in writing; * * *

ADDENDUM A

UNIFORM REAL ESTATE CONTRACT
"This is a legally binding form, if not understood, scelc competent advice."
1. THIS AGREFMKNT, made in duplicate this

2lct

day of

slul^L

by ai.d betueen _ Al„Smith _Const,. Cp^..
hereinafter designated as the Seller, and
l&rlcne_Stout
hereinafter designated as the Buyer, of

Ucst-Jordon,

, A. D., 19-7-8. ,

(

Utah-

2.. WITNESSETH: That the Seller, for the consideration herein mention* <1 ngrte:i to «?ell and com jy to th«» hu:.»'r,
and the buv*r lor tne considviatiuit herein rnt-ntioncd agrees to purcharo tlw fellowm" d«^crih<vl n al property, situ ite m
the county of

, State of Utah, to-wit: JhlZO. w » S o p J J b r i s t l s _ J d L

S a l t Lake

ADDHLS9

More particularly described as follows:

So. Jonlon,

Utah

$K)65

Lot 23 Clciunoor Village, according to the official plat thereof
recorded in the offices of Gait Lake County

3. Said Buyer hereby agrees to enter into possession and pay for said described premises the sum of

^'intxjaflyeiL.tliou^and fiva hunrirctLAjO/lOO - ~ _

±~ Uuiiars ($.97^500^00--)

po>ablc at the office of Seller, his assigns or order .A& -d-UfQClodJzy O C i l c r . — ..

—.

s'.rir.iy within the following times, to-wit:
cash, the receipt of which is hereby acknowledged, and the balance of $—2Z+.QQCL.QQ

shall be paid as follows:

An additional $5,000.00 down payment to be paid within 90 days from
this date. $>3?.93 or more each month principal and interest plus
1/12 of the General property taxes and 1/12 of the annual fire insurance
premium each month payable commencing on Aucust 1, 1973 and on the
z (1st) day of each month until the unpaid principal and interest if;
paid in full. The estimated taxes and insurance costs for the remainder
of 1973 are $200.00 per month jnakfcng the payment $788.00 per month. The
buyer will refinance the hone within 5 years of this date and pay the
Possession of said premises sifall"Le ift'Iivcred to buyer onlne"*-!

lS.t

'.— day of —J.uXy

, I J... 73 .

4. Said monthly payments are to be applied first to the payment of interest and second to the ndu-tion of the
principal. Interest shall bo chained from , *H*ly *» 1 9 / P

, — on all unpaid portions of the

purchase price at the rate of
ten
per cent (
10
Tr) r«»r annum. The Buyer, at his option jt anytime,
:,my pa; amounts in excess of the monthly payments upon the unpaid balance subject to the limitations of any mortgage
or co-iuact h*. the Bu\cr herein assumed, such excens to be applied either to unpaid prinrip U or in prepayment of future
installments at th« election of the buyer, which election must be made at the lime the excess payment is made.
3. It is un.U-r-tood and agreed th.it if the Seller accepts payment from the Buyer on '-his conliact less than according
to th? t'rms here:n mentioned, then by 30 doin»», it will in no way alter the terms of the contract as to the forfeiture
hereinafter stipulated, or as to any other remedies of the seller.
**

6. It is understood that there presently exists an obligation against said property Jn favor of —jD^Qy—
"ort*;a.\e Co,
~Tvith an unpaid balance of

$-67^00^00

as of _ J j j ] j L l Q , J L 9 7 8

7. Seller represents that there are no unpaid special improvement district ta\e.< covering improvements to said premises now- in the pioc«;ss of being installed, or which have been completed and not paid (or, outstanding against said property, except the following _Nq_OXCqp_tlpn3
8. The Seller is given the option to secure, execute and maintain loans secured by said property of not to exceed the
then unpaid contract balance hereunder, bearing interest at the rate ot not to exceed
Ten
percent
(__ 1 0
<T«-) per annum and pt\ab!o in regular monthly installments; provided that the aggregate monthly installment
pigments required to be mnde by Seller on said loaii3 shall not be greater than each installment pa>ment requiied to be
made by the Buyer under this contract. When the principal due hereunder has been reduced to the amount of any such
loan* and mortgage the Seller ngicea to convey and the Buyer agrees to accept title to the above described pioperty
subject to said loans and mortgages.
9. If the Bu\er desires to exercise his right through accelerat-d payments under this agreement to pay off any obligations outstanding at date of this agreement against said property, it shall be the Iltiyot'd obligation to a»*ume and
pay any penalty whkh may b« rnpmcd on prepayment of said prior obligations. Prepayment penalties in respect
to obligations against said picpeity incurred by Heller, after date of this agivemeut, thall be paid by seller unless
said obligations are assumed or approved by bu>cr.
10. The Buyer agrees upon written request of the Seller to mahe application to a reliable lender fur a loan of vich
amount J3 can be icvUied ui.der the regulations of raid lender and hereby arrcv* t« apply any amount no received up«>n
the purchase price abo\e mentioned, and to execute the papers required and p.iy one-half the expenses necessary in obtai-M^i* sanl loan, tho Seller agreeing to pay tlie other one-half, provided however, th.it the monthl) payments and
interest ra»e required, shall not exceed the monthly payments and interest tale a3 outlined ahovo.
11. The Buyer agree-* to puv all taxc3 and assessments of every kind and nature which are or which may be asse*««d
and which may become due on these premiss during the life of thii agreement. The Seller hereby covenants and agrees
that there are no assessments against said premises except the following:

No Qxcejtlona
ADDENDUM B

The Seller further covenant* and agrees that ho will not default in the y ivment of his obligations against said properly.
12.

The J5u\er agrees to pay the general i:.xcs after

13.

The Buyer

further

ar.rccs

J.uly._l»

to keep ul\ insurable huiWitKs

197&

_.;

and improvement*

on said p r e m i e s insured in a com-

pany acceptable to the Seller in the amount of not less than the unpaid halar.ee on tins c o n t r a c t o r S **"T!—7_
and to assign <au! iiisurai.ee '.o the Seller a? hi., interests may appear and lo delivu the insuiunce policy t«-» himT
14. In the event l!ie Hincr -mall default in tat payment ot an> special or rent in! taxes, a -.;< s s i m n t * or insurance
premium* a s he:ein provided, the Seller may. at his option, pay raid taxes, assessments aial in^uianco premiums or either
of tin m, and tf Seller c!«»;*H so to do. 'hen f he Hover ai:iee> to repay the- SeUei upon demand, all j.wl» sum? v . advanced
and paid »»y htm, ;ogeth*v with i n t e r e r t h t t . u n front date of payment of : aid s u m ; at the rate of •); of one p e u c n t per
month until paid.
1". Buyer asricvs that he will not commit or >t;ffer to IK- reitimitted any vaatc. -puil, or destruction i:- u r upon
iaid premised, and that he udl maintain said p i e i . i . o a \n good condition.
10. In the w e n t o( a failure to comply with the term.* hereof hy the L'uycr, or «f
failure of th* Buy*; to make
any payment or payments, when the
me shall b*coir>c due. or within _ T h i r t y _L3QjL
days theicafter. the
Sv'tler, al hi» opt .on .-.Lull h a w Use f d l o u i i e ; a l t e r n a t e s remedies:
A. Seller s t a l l have the liitbt. upon faduie of the Buyer to ivmedv tin -default wilhm f i w ilaya after written notice,
to be K'!«-iM';l truiu all obligations in law and in equity to convey .said propeitv, and all p a v n a n t s viiitii have
been m:i.l.» theieJi.foiv on this eoiitia-t hy the Buyer, fhall he f o i f e i u d lo the Seller as li'iualatcl d.imne. .-» for
the i on I»>M i-'ioiance of Uie contiact. and the Buyer ngioet that 11 •• - Siller loay at hi.; option re-et.l* t ai'il'tal.e
po.^w .io: of s.nd pi-eo'i.-:i> without ht;al p r o e e ^ e i :i> in it; I ii -t an.I former « J.i.'e, tor.'-thci- vitl: aj/ HO/M-MC'n«ent; a i d additions made hy \\w Buyer thereon, and the said additions and improvement-.; shall u-miin v\ith
the l a i d and become the property of the Seller, tin l'.uyer becoming at once a ten tnt at will of the i \). »•; or
B. The SvlLi may hiing suit and rceover judgement for all delinquent installments, including c . u and att'.jnrys
fees. iThe use of this lemedy on one or imuv occasions shall not pre., tit the Seller, at his option, from u .sorting
to one of the other lemedies hereunder in the event of a . . a b l u e n t default): or
C. The Seller >hall have the l i g h t , at his option, and upon wtitUu notice to live Buyer, to declaie th" ci-.ttr*- unpaid
balance hereunder at once IIUQ and payable, and may eleet to tieat this contract "a- a note and mart it:«\ and p:»s«;
title to the I h n c r sul>jec» thereto, and proceed immediately to fo»e.do.;e the *ame in ac<«rdarice with'iio- 1-iv.s <>.'
the Slate of I'tah, ivA have the property sold and the pioceed:; applied to the pa\ n.^nt of toe balaiu-e o.vin;:,
including costs and attorney's f e e s ; and the Seller may h a \ e a judgement for any i h f o i e i i c y whiih »»:;»•. l u n a i i i .
In the cr..-e of l'uici'lo.uirv, the Seller heieundei, upon the filinj: of a complaint, .-.'lu.ll he iirmodiatel:. entit'.el to
the app.jrr.ment of a i v i v i \ e r to t ik» p>.»sse^sion of said tuotti'.ae' d prop»it> a i • • I collei» the icnt-i, »-:.»H*A ar.l
profits l . e u U o i n and a\«ply the >ame to the p a \ n . c n t of the otdivation h e i e m u k i , or hold the s i m c |>u<suant
to utuK-r of the couit; and the Seller, upon entry of janirinent of futede-burc, shall he entitled to the }ios.>csbion
of the said premi.su.> diuim; the period of redemption.
17. It is agreed that time ii the essence of this agreement.
IS. In tl.t c v . n t there arc any liens or «ncumhrauces a/ninst :a'ol premise.? otlur lh:.?« t h o . e h.-uin provided for or
r e f e n r d to, or in the event any hens or eneu-nhrauces other than fieiein provid-.-d for shall hereafter accrue a;;air.it the
sar •» by acts or nculcct of the Seller, then the H»«yer ma>, at his option, pay a:ul distharue the same and rreeivc credit
on th^ amount then temaining due hereunder in the amount of any >uch payment or payments and t h e i e a f t t r the p a y .
r-.cn?" herein pr».el led to be made, may. nt thr option of the l'.ayer, bo suspended until such a time as such suspended
p»yir.*;nt* shall cq.ial any ^ums advanced a> al'ou-said.
19. The Seller on receivinp the payment-- herein reserve! U> be paid at the time and in iUo mnnner above nien*i>"»ned
n^rees to execu'c and deliver to the Buyer or a>-icn$, a j/ood and suf'Jrient warranty deed conveying th^ title to the
above described premises free and c h a r of r.ll cm •umbra nee.-* except a.i h e n in mention'.} and except n:< may have a*v»uod
by or through the acts or nc:'l>'('t of the Bu>er. and to furni>h at his expanse, a policy of title insurance in the amount
of \b» purchase price or at the option of the Seller, an a t t r a c t brought to date at tune of rale or at any time d a i i n g the
teirr. of this agreement, or nt time of delivery of deed, at the up*ion of l'.uyer.
20. It i« hereby expressly understood and agreed by the parties hereto that the Buyer accepts the said p r . p e r t y
in its present condition and that there arc no representation*, eovenauU, or agreements bet.veen the parties hereto with
reference to said property except 33 herein specifically set forth or attached hereto - H Q I I G

21. The Hu\cr and Seller each agree that .-hould they default in any of the covenants nr agreements contained her*
in, that the defaulting parly -diall pay alt costs and expenses, including a reasonable attorney's fee, which may arise
or accrue from enforcing this agreement, or in obtaining possession of the premises covered hereby, or in pui.;uing any
rtni*-Jy orovided hereunder or by the statutes of the State of Utah whether such remedy is pursued by filing a suit
or otherwise.
22. It is understoed that the stipulations aforesaid are to apply to and bind the heirs, executors, administrator*, successors, and assigns of the re*pccti\e parties hereto.
IN W I T N K S S W H E R E O F , the said parties to this agreement have hereunto signed their name*, the day and year
f i m above written.
Signed in the presence of

_

{feller

Buyer

5*
o

S
CD

£4

o

# Kin <

WHEN BBOOftDBD, MAIL TO:
Pariana Stout
3683 South 2200 Weat, Unit #67
Weat Valley City, Utah 84119

(

3S41 Ji(j
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WARRANTY

DEE

T-tt

UN J
^35

P

Alvin R. Smith dba Al Smith Conatruetion Company
of

S a l t Lake City

, County of

hereby CONVEY a and WARRANT a to

, State of Utah,

S a l t Lake

DARLENE STOUT
Sown* 7 5 r t s * r

'• fW+jT
.grantee

of Weat v a l l e y c i t y

, County of

S a l t Lake

, State of Utah

for the sum of TEN DOLLARS AND OTHER GOOD AND VALUABLE CONSIDER^££^fij,

the following described Met of tad la

cwr, •tete of Utah, fcMrtli

SALT LAKE

LOT 23» GLINMOOR COUNTRY ESTATES #1, FrJMP H K % CITY OF SOUTH
JORDAN, COUNTY or SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH, my undivided one-half
interest therein and thereto.

WITNESS the hand of satd graaw

#

this

21at

day of

J

^ne

,18 ***

Signed in the pre* snee of
Alvin R. Smith dba Al Smith
Construction Company

STATE OF UTAH,
County r(

i;alt Lake

}-

'to the
21at
d^'ei June
- \ ;,%.. , 1 8 8 2
pereooeily appeared before c e Alvin R. Smith dba Al S n i i t ^ o f c e t ^ j u c t i p n ^
Company
**
!•;
^-r^~
the signer
of the shore inataunent, who (injy yknowleaged teiac-that ^T ezacotee* t&a

vitr^,Vrfd5 m , . ; •A>,Jr>.V% • T:i^. >.'
My fommissUMi expires 1:20-84

Residfaf la

«*** fof g

Af PR0VRD FORM — UTAH SBCURTria* OOMMMKOji
POftM let - WASJIANTV DOT* - OUVM^M

ADDENDUM C

t y

t s ' ••
"^TT"

C.>..''nity o t b a l i LrtRC

7

i the U'.u'/'rsi^H'
UUih. do hiMShy U
of ti saa1 iii..i <»i; (V
wntingb re^-.'i'O'J .
and that i!u; *»r <•< *
< . p / Ol UC, (T, ;,<;.:'

Witness m/ h i v l ;
r*ii- .",?

. f:;
J vr,i of ii^o f ^ u ^ r
' __.

- ^ 19 .

KA7 it t 0 ! ^ , B-frscr^i/

f>eM.;v

/
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FILED IN CLERK'S OFFICE
Salt LaKe City, Utah

CARL J . NEMELKA - Utah. 3 a r No^.,2395. ,
JUNE LUBNIEWSKI WILSOIl r p t a h * ^ r r t t o 4367
A t t o r n e y s f o r DefendattttlStifcwiy* C L /
610 East South Temple, Suite 2U2
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Telephone: (801)521-5552

J UN 1 0 1986
H Dixon Hiijdley,
ndle
By

rk 3|d Oist Cou
Deputy Clork

IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
—oooOooo—

fij

£ # 7

6 "M-/C

MARCY G. MYERS,

"

jyp

-

.

2>;J

ORDER AND JUDGMENT

Plaintiff,

£ * $

o

a^

vs.
Civil No. C 82-5014

DARLENE STOUT, et al.,
Defendants.

Judge Fishier
oooOooo--^-

Defendant's Motion to Introduce Exhibit, for Additional
Findings of Fact and for Judgment and plaintiff's Motion for
Judgment and Motion to Re-open Proceedings to Receive Evidence
were heard by the Honorable Philip Fishier on Monday, Mav
5, 1986.

Upon agreement of counsel, and being fullv apprised

of the matter the court entered its Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law and the following Order and Judgment,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:
1)

A certified copy of a Quitclaim Decree dated May

24, 1982, recorded June 7, 1982 at Page 1046 of Book 5380
in the Salt Lake County Recorders Office in which Larsen &
Sons, Inc. is grantor and Jody Larsen is grantee be, and
hereby is admitted into evidence;
2)

A certified en

of the corporate documents of

ADDENDUM D

Larsen & Sons, Inc. on file with the State of Utah Division
of Corporations be and hereby is, admitted into evidence;
3)

The court does hereby take judicial notice of the

Pleadings and Discovery on file herein; and
4)

Plaintiff's Motion for Judgment be and hereby is

denied and that defendant's Motion for Judgment be and/
hereby is granted.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that
defendant Darlene Stout Conple is the sole and exclusive
owner in fee of the real property more particularly described
as:
Lot 23, Glenmoor Country Estates #1, Plat K,
according to the official plat thereof on file
in the office of the County Recorder of Salt Lake
County, Utah.
and title to the above-described real property is hereby
quieted in Darlene Stout Copple.

The Salt Lake County

Recorder's office is ordered that the records therein shall
reflect Darlene Stout Copplefs title thereto.
DATED this

#lday

QfQ^c^-

1986

BY THE COURT:

PHILIP
Approved as to Form:

msntu

DistrictA Judge
V
M

ROYAL K. HUNT
Attorney for Plaintiff

ATTCQT

. JJlLKini P>
H DIXON HINDLEi
CLERK
fcputyXSieri

LKA
or Defendant
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